Von Neumann Was Not a Quantum Bayesian by Stacey, Blake C.
Von Neumann Was Not a Quantum Bayesian
Blake C. Stacey1
1Department of Physics, University of Massachusetts Boston,
100 Morrissey Blvd., Boston, MA 02125, United States
Wikipedia has claimed for over three years now that John von Neumann was the
“first quantum Bayesian.” In context, this reads as stating that von Neumann inau-
gurated QBism, the approach to quantum theory promoted by Fuchs, Mermin and
Schack. This essay explores how such a claim is, historically speaking, unsupported.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Wikipedia article on Quantum Bayesianism has claimed since April 2012 that John
von Neumann was the “first quantum Bayesian” [79]. To a reader acquainted with quantum
foundations and the history of quantum theory, this is a strikingly odd assertion. This note
explains why the claim is incorrect and explores how it came to be made.
A “Quantum Bayesian” is one who interprets the probabilities arising in quantum physics
according to some variety of the Bayesian view of probabilities. Given the profusion of
schools of thought under the Bayesian umbrella, it should not be surprising that a variety
of ways to be some kind of Bayesian about quantum theory has also arisen [3, 5, 12, 16, 21,
39, 42, 55, 56, 77, 78, 81, 91, 109]. The most radical approach is QBism, which maintains
that all quantum states are expressions of personalist Bayesian probabilities about potential
future experiences [5, 32–37, 59–63, 92, 98]. For this essay, I will take the writings of Fuchs,
Mermin and Schack [32–37, 59–63] as the defining statements of what a QBist is and is not.
Furthermore, their union and intersection are indicative of what a QBist might be, might
not be and is not obligated to entertain.
QBism is the primary focus of the Wikipedia article on Quantum Bayesianism, and the
take-away impression is that John von Neumann was not just a partisan of the Bayesian
lifestyle, but also the first QBist. This is an untenable claim.
In this essay, we will not be strongly concerned with which interpretation of quantum
mechanics is “correct,” or with what it might mean for an interpretation of quantum me-
chanics to be “correct.” Our focus will instead be on who said what and when. However,
to evaluate the “von Neumann was the first Quantum Bayesian” claim properly, we need
to clarify what a “Quantum Bayesian” world view might be, and QBism, in many ways an
extreme among such views, provides a convenient vantage point. Therefore, we will establish
the basic notions of QBism, and then in following sections we will turn to the writings of
von Neumann.
II. QBISM
QBism is an interpretation of quantum mechanics which takes as fundamental the ideas
of agent and experience. A “quantum measurement” is, in QBism, an act which an agent
performs on the external world. A quantum state is an agent’s encoding of her own personal
expectations for what she might experience as a result of carrying out an action. This holds
true for all quantum states, pure or mixed; a state without an agent is a contradiction in
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2terms. Furthermore, each experience is a personal event specific to the agent who evokes
it. Cabello classifies QBism as a kind of “participatory realism,” similar to the thinking of
John Wheeler [13].
Different authors have emphasized different aspects of QBism. The discussions by Bar-
num [5] and Mermin [59–63], and the briefer remarks by Schlosshauer, Claringbold and
Żukowski [86, 112], place their focus on how QBism gives meaning to the current mathe-
matical formalism of quantum theory. Fuchs and Schack have also addressed this aspect [34],
while in addition pushing forward technical work which aims to reformulate quantum theory
and build it up anew from explicitly QBist postulates [35]. Due to the historical subject
matter of this essay, the former will be more relevant here.1
Individual statements and arguments drawn from the writings of other scientists can
sometimes fit neatly within the QBist programme. Examples come to mind in the works of
Aaronson [1, pp. xii–xiii, 110], Bacon [2], Baez [3], Bell [62, 63], Einstein [37], Feynman [28,
p. 6 -7], Nielsen [68], Peierls [63], Schrödinger [60, 62, 63] and others. This is not to claim
that any of these authors are QBist or proto-QBist (the latter term being also unpleasantly
teleological). Indeed, one can find self-identified non-QBists and critics of QBism who agree
with QBists on nontrivial points [10, 64]. Physicists and their opinions are sufficiently com-
plicated that we cannot pigeonhole them based on isolated snippets of text. Placement and
classification require more systematic study than that, if they are to have any meaning. With
this concern in mind, we turn to surveying the writings of von Neumann. First, we shall
see that von Neumann’s interpretation of probability, though it displayed varying nuances
over time, never aligned with that advocated by Fuchs, Mermin and Schack. Then, we will
study the evidence indicating that von Neumann made a category distinction between differ-
ent kinds of quantum states that QBists (and some other varieties of Quantum Bayesians)
do not. Having established that “Quantum Bayesian” is not a good description for von
Neumann’s thought, we will turn to the argument that underlies the claim in Wikipedia.
Digging into the material that ostensibly supports that claim will reveal that support to be
rather insubstantial.
III. VON NEUMANN ON PROBABILITY
A. Frequentism (1932)
To begin with, we examine von Neumann’s Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Me-
chanics, hereinafter MFQM. This book is indicative of von Neumann’s thinking in 1932, the
1 This is not to say that the more technical side of QBism is without historical and philosophical interest.
The roots of the mathematics involved go back to Schwinger [87] and Weyl [110, §IV.D.14], indeed
to the very transition from the “old quantum theory” to the new [36, pp. 2055–56, 2257–58, 2280].
And, in the SIC representation of quantum states and channels, the Born rule—usually written like
p(i) = tr(ρEi)—and unitary evolution—typically written like ρ(t) = Utρ(0)U†t —take the same form.
Both are simple affine deformations of the Law of Total Probability [35]. This clarifies that both are
synchronic relations between probability ascriptions [34]. Alice carries a probability distribution for an
informationally complete measurement, which she uses to summarize her expectations. Alice can calculate
other probability distributions from it, synchronically, including distributions for other informationally
complete measurements which she might carry out in the distant future.
3time of the publication of the original German edition. Quoting from MFQM, page 298:
However, the investigation of the physical quantities related to a single object
S is not the only thing which can be done – especially if doubts exist relative
to the simultaneous measurability of several quantities. In such cases it is also
possible to observe great statistical ensembles which consist of many systems
S1, . . . , SN (i.e., N models of S, N large).156
Note 156 reads as follows:
Such ensembles, called collectives, are in general necessary for establishing
probability theory as the theory of frequencies. They were introduced by R. v.
Mises, who discovered their meaning for probability theory, and who built up
a complete theory on this foundation (cf., for example, his book, “Wahrschein-
lichkeit, Statistik and ihre Wahrenheit,” Berlin, 1928).
[Solche Gesamtheiten, Kollektive gennant, sind überhaupt notwendig um
die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung als Lehre von den Häufigkeiten begründen zu
können. Sie wurden von R. v. Mises eingeführt, der ihre Bedeutung für die
Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung erkannte, und einen entsprechenden Aufbau der-
selben durchführte (vgl. z. B. sein Buch Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und ihre
Wahrheit, Berlin 1928).]
Notice the discrepancy in the titles given for von Mises’ book; apparently, the translator
made an error here. In fact, von Neumann also errs in this passage, as the “ihre” is an
interpolation. Nevertheless, the meaning of the passage is clear: in 1932, von Neumann
interpreted probability in a frequentist manner.
Evidence of this occurs throughout MFQM, in fact. For example, “expectation value”
is defined as “the arithmetic mean of all results of measurement in a sufficiently large sta-
tistical ensemble” (p. 308). Lüders, who improved upon von Neumann’s theory of mea-
surement [58], also thought in terms of “an ensemble of identical and independent systems”
[“einer Gesamtheit gleichartiger und unabhängiger Systeme”]. This is one example of later
researchers not finding a Bayesian message in von Neumann.
B. Probability as Extended Logic (c. 1937)
To see how von Neumann’s thinking on the foundations of probability changed, we turn
next to an unfinished manuscript from about 1937, which is included in his Collected
Works [107]. Von Neumann imagines a collection of a large number of “specimens” of a
physical system S1 and considers interpreting the transition probability P (a, b) = θ in terms
of a relative frequency:
[I]f we measure on each S∗1 , . . . , S∗N first a, and then in immediate succession b,
and if then the number of those among S∗1 , . . . , S∗N where a is found to be true
is M , and the number of those where a, b are both found to be true is M ′, then:
(H) P (a, b) = θ means that M ′/M → θ for N →∞.
This view, the so called “frequency theory of probability” has been very bril-
liantly upheld and expounded by R. V. Mises. This view, however, is not accept-
able to us, at least not in the present “logical” context. We do not think that (H)
really expresses a convergence-statement in the strict mathematical sense of the
4word—at least not without extending the physical terminology and ideology to
infinite systems (namely, to the entirety of an infinite sequence S∗1 , S∗2 , . . .)—and
we are not prepared to carry out such an extension at this stage. The approx-
imative forms of (H), on the other hand, are mere probability-statements, e.g.
“Bernoulli’s law of great numbers” [. . .] And such probability-statements are
again of the same nature as the relation P (a, b) = θ, which they should inter-
pret.
Von Neumann then makes the following declaration:
We prefer, therefore, to disclaim any intention to interpret the relations
P (a, b) = θ (0 < θ < 1) in terms of strict logics. In other words, we admit:
Probability logics cannot be reduced to strict logics, but constitute an essen-
tially wider system than the latter, and statements of the form P (a, b) = θ
(0 < θ < 1) are perfectly new and sui generis aspects of physical reality.
So probability logics appear as an essential extension of strict logics. This
view, the so-called “logical theory of probability” is the foundation of J. N. [sic]
Keynes’s work on the subject.
In short, the later von Neumann interprets quantum probabilities as logical probabilities.
Moreover, he explicitly identifies this view with that worked out by Keynes.
At this point, it is a good idea to compare Keynes’ “logical probability” to the thinking of
F. P. Ramsey, whose interpretation is closer to that invoked in QBism [36, pp. ix, 1225–29,
1374]. Fortunately, we have a statement by Keynes himself on this subject. In October
1931—after Ramsey’s death at the age of twenty-six—Keynes wrote the following [52].
Formal logic is concerned with nothing but the rules of consistent thought.
But in addition to this we have certain “useful mental habits” for handling the
material with which we are supplied by our perceptions and by our memory and
perhaps in other ways, and so arriving at or towards truth; and the analysis
of such habits is also a sort of logic. The application of these ideas to the
logic of probability is very fruitful. Ramsey argues, as against the view which
I had put forward, that probability is concerned not with objective relations
between propositions but (in some sense) with degrees of belief, and he succeeds
in showing that the calculus of probabilities simply amounts to a set of rules for
ensuring that the system of degrees of belief which we hold shall be a consistent
system. Thus the calculus of probabilities belongs to formal logic. But the basis
of our degrees of belief—or the a priori, as they used to be called—is part of our
human outfit, perhaps given us merely by natural selection, analogous to our
perceptions and our memories rather than to formal logic.
And, having made this comparison, Keynes goes on to say,
So far I yield to Ramsey—I think he is right. But in attempting to distinguish
“rational” degrees of belief from belief in general he was not yet, I think, quite
successful. It is not getting to the bottom of the principle of induction merely to
say that it is a useful mental habit. Yet in attempting to distinguish a “human”
logic from formal logic on the one hand and descriptive psychology on the other,
Ramsey may have been pointing the way to the next field of study when formal
logic has been put into good order and its highly limited scope properly defined.
5C. Debating Bohr in Warsaw (1938)
In 1938, von Neumann attended a conference in Warsaw on “New Theories in Physics.”
The meeting, which ran from 30 May to 3 June, was attended by Bohr, Brillouin, de Broglie,
C. G. Darwin, Eddington, Gamow, Kramers, Langevin, Wigner and others. Bohr presented
a report on “The Causality Problem in Atomic Physics,” to which von Neumann replied in
the discussion afterward [7]. Von Neumann’s remarks begin by interpreting probabilities in
terms of ensembles:
If we wish to analyse the meaning of the statistical statements of quantum
mechanics, we must necessarily deal with « ensembles » of a great number of
identical systems, and not with individual systems.
He segues, however, into a discussion of quantum logic, arguing that the central point is the
failure of the distributive law. This leads to the following:
A complete derivation of quantum mechanics is only possible if the proposi-
tional calculus of logics is so extended, as to include probabilities, in harmony
with the ideas of J. M. Keynes. In the quantum mechanical terminology : the
notion of a « transition probability » from a to b, to be denoted by P (a, b) must
be introduced. (P (a, b) is the probability of b, if a is known to be true. P (a, b)
can be used to define a 5 b and −a : P (a, b) = 1 means a 5 b, P (a, b) = 0
means a 5 −b. But P (a, b) = φ, with a φ > 0, < 1 is a new « sui generis »
statement, only understandable in terms of probabilities.)
It is interesting that von Neumann does not attempt to use Keynesian logical-probability
theory to define single-shot probabilities. Instead, he still treats statistical statements as
having meaning only for ensembles.
D. Game Theory (1944)
Von Neumann coauthored the textbook Theory of Games and Economic Behavior with
Oskar Morgenstern. The book, first published in 1944, is frequentist in orientation, though
the authors express this as a matter of convenience rather than necessity. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern call the “interpretation of probability as frequency in long runs” a “perfectly
well founded” notion, but they leave the door open to alternative conceptions of probabil-
ity [105]. Morgenstern later explained [65],
We were, of course, aware of the difficulty with the logical foundations of proba-
bility theory. We decided we would base our arguments on the classical frequency
definition of probability, but we included a footnote saying that one could ax-
iomatize utility and probability together and introduce a subjective notion of
probability. This was done later by others.
For the work in question, see Pfanzagl [74–76].
6E. Generating Random Numbers (1951)
One of von Neumann’s memorable remarks has gained a certain infamy: “Any one who
considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin.”
This quotation occurs in an item in a 1951 volume of conference proceedings, where von
Neumann also discusses physical phenomena which can be used to generate random numer-
ical sequences [106]. He proposes “nuclear accidents” as the ideal source, which in the era
after Chernobyl and Fukushima comes across as slightly ominous. However, in context it is
plain enough that the “accidents” in question are events like individual clicks from a Geiger
counter.
There are nuclear accidents, for example, which are the ideal of randomness, and
up to a certain accuracy you can count them. One difficulty is that one is never
quite sure what is the probability of occurrence of the nuclear accident. This
difficulty has been overcome by taking larger counts than one [does] in testing
for either even or odd. To cite a human example, for simplicity, in tossing a coin
it is probably easier to make two consecutive tosses independent than to toss
heads with probability exactly one-half. If independence of probability tosses
is assumed, we can reconstruct a 50–50 chance out of even a badly biased coin
by tossing twice. If we get heads-heads or tails-tails, we reject the tosses and
try again. If we get heads-tails (or tails-heads), we accept the result as heads
(or tails). The resulting process is rigorously unbiased, although the amended
process is at most 25 percent as efficient as ordinary coin-tossing.
The language here is prima facie frequentist or propensity-inclined, treating probabilities
as unknown quantities to be measured (“one is never quite sure what is the probability of
occurrence of the nuclear accident”). A Bayesian can give meaning to statements about
“unknown probabilities”—this is the territory of the de Finetti theorem [17]—but von Neu-
mann’s phrasing does not sound like a stringent Bayesian’s first choice of words.
In summary, von Neumann’s interpretation of probability moved from a kollectiv-based
strict frequentism to a Keynesian view. Nowhere do we find an outright endorsement of
personalist Bayesianism; the closest approach is much later than MFQM, is not in the
context of quantum theory, and is itself mixed in with a claim that thinking of probability
as long-run frequency is good enough for practical purposes.
IV. PURE AND MIXED STATES
Von Neumann’s philosophy of probability, and the way his thinking changed over time, has
been discussed by others—for example, by Bub [11], Rédei [82], Stairs [94] and Valente [99].
Less remarked-upon, but also important to this comment, are von Neumann’s statements
concerning the distinction between pure and mixed quantum states.
Returning to MFQM, on page 295 we find the following:
In the state φ the quantity R has the expectation value ρ = (Rφ, φ) and
has as its dispersion 2 the expectation value of the quantity (R − ρ)2, i.e.,
((R − ρ · 1)2φ, φ) = ||Rφ||2 − (Rφ, φ)2 (cf. Note 130; all these are calculated
with the aid of E¯·!) which is in general > 0 (and = 0 only for Rφ = ρ · φ,
cf. III.3.) – therefore there exists a statistical distribution of R, even though
7φ is one individual state – as we have repeatedly noted.) But the statistical
character may become even more prominent, if we do not even know what state is
actually present – for example, when several states φ1, φ2, . . . with the respective
probabilities w1, w2, . . . (w1 ≥ 0, w2 ≥ 0,. . ., w1 + w2 + · · · = 1) constitute the
description. Then the expectation value of the quantity R, in the sense of the
generally valid rules of the calculus of probabilities is ρ′ = ∑nwn · (Rφn, φn).
The language here indicates that for von Neumann, a pure state is something an individual
system has, and a more general density matrix stands for an ensemble in which different
pure states are physically present with different frequencies.
Von Neumann writes freely of properties possessed by quantum systems (p. 338):
Instead of saying that several results of measurement (on S) are known, we can
also say that S was examined in relation to a certain property E and its presence
was ascertained. [. . .] The information about S therefore always amounts to the
presence of a certain property E which is formally characterized by stating the
projection E.
And, shortly thereafter, bluntly:
That is, if E is present, the state is φ.
An exhaustive measurement fixes the value of a physical property, and the presence of
a physical property can mandate the correctness of a choice of quantum state. Unsharp
measurements, in von Neumann’s development, “are incomplete and do not succeed in de-
termining a unique state” (p. 340). Again, we see the language making a category distinction
between quantities which are “states” and more general entities which are not. Later, von
Neumann writes that a density operator which is a “mixture of several states” is “not a
state” itself (p. 350). This distinction is maintained throughout his discussion of what we
now call the von Neumann entropy.
This idea, that pure and mixed states are qualitatively different kinds of entity, went
unquestioned by Bohm [8], but was soon challenged by Jaynes [48]. One can conceive
of uncertainty intrinsic to a pure state and uncertainty about which pure state might be
present. However, as Jaynes writes,
If the former probabilities are interpreted in the objective sense, while the latter
are clearly subjective, we have a very puzzling situation. Many different arrays,
representing different combinations of subjective and objective aspects, all lead
to the same density matrix, and thus to the same predictions.
This argument was later made by Ochs [70], and by Caves, Fuchs and Schack [17]. The
latter authors write, “a mixed state has infinitely many ensemble decompositions into pure
states”—even into different numbers of pure states—“so the distinction between subjective
and objective becomes hopelessly blurred.”2
2 The mathematical point of the multiplicity of ensemble decompositions was made most famously by
Hughston, Jozsa and Wootters [46] in 1993. It was also demonstrated almost sixty years earlier by
Schrödinger [85], who disclaimed priority for the result, suggesting that some form of the idea was folk
knowledge or shared conversationally at the time. The fact that a mixed state can be decomposed in
multiple ways is one of the phenomena reproduced in the “epistricted” models of Spekkens et al. [89, 90].
8Arguably, it would be more consistent for a strict Kollectivist to treat all quantum states,
pure and mixed, in ensemble terms, where pure states correspond to the most purified
possible ensembles. However, von Neumann’s statements about the presence of physical
properties determining unique states clash with this position.
V. MEASUREMENT AND SUBJECTIVITY
As we noted in Section II, it is not so difficult to find in physicists’ writings statements
which, taken in isolation, are compatible with QBism. The more important question is
whether a verbal corpus yields up enough of these cherries to fill a bowl.
The last chapter of MFQM concerns “The Measuring Process.” Here, we find mentions
of “subjective perception” and “the intellectual inner life of the individual” (p. 418). Surely
this is where we should look for evidence of von Neumann’s Quantum-Bayesian sympathies.
He writes (p. 420),
Indeed experience only makes statements of this type: an observer has made a
certain (subjective) observation; and never any like this: a physical quantity has
a certain value.
But the idea that we ultimately rely on sense impressions to adjudicate between scientific
models is hardly original to quantum mechanics, or to Bayesian interpretations thereof. A
form of the idea is attributed to Democritus [22], and Lucretius discussed it in verse [57].
Schrödinger commented, “Quantum mechanics forbids statements about what really exists—
statements about the object. Its statements deal only with the object-subject relation.”
However, he continued, “this holds, after all, for any description of nature”; the crucial point
is that in quantum physics, it “holds in a much more radical and far reaching sense” [33].
In classical mechanics, the mass of an object is a basic property which that object has
whether or not a physicist is nearby to be interested in it. Let us imagine a physicist
working in the days before quantum theory. He drops a rock on his foot and sees red—a
subjective perception. He then uses this perception, which is part of his “inner life,” to rule
out the hypothesis that the rock is of negligible mass. The variable m in his equations refers
to an intrinsic property of the rock, not to any of his sensations, even though his sensory
perceptions are what he uses to assign a value (or a spread of reasonable values) to the
variable m. For the Newtonian, the rock has a mass, although the Newtonian might admit
when pressed that any particular value used in a calculation is chosen because it adequately
summarizes past experiences and helps to predict future ones.
The critical question is whether von Neumann reads the mathematical entities appearing
in the quantum formalism as physical quantities akin to Newtonian masses, about which
we can use subjective perceptions to make estimations, or if he reads those mathematical
entities as standing for perceptions themselves. The blanket statement quoted above that
“experience only makes statements of this type” certainly suggests that he views the point
about “(subjective) observation” to be applicable to classical physics. The evidence we
saw in the previous section indicates that von Neumann treats quantum states as physical
properties held by objects themselves, that is, as more analogous to the mass of a Newtonian
rock than to experiences in the flow of “intellectual inner life.”
At one point in the Warsaw proceedings, von Neumann does approach a statement which
might not sound completely out of place coming from a QBist. In a later discussion than
the exchange we examined above, the Warsaw proceedings record the following [7, p. 44].
9Professor von Neumann thought that there must always be an observer
somewhere in a system : it was therefore necessary to establish a limit between
the observed and the observer. But it was by no means necessary that this limit
should coincide with the geometrical limits of the physical body of the individual
who observes. We could quite well « contract » the observer or « expand »
him : we could include all that passed within the eye of the observer in the
« observed » part of the system — which is described in a quantum manner.
Then the « observer » would begin behind the retina. Or we could include part
of the apparatus which we used in the physical observation — a microscope for
instance — in the « observer ». The principle of « psycho-physical parallelism »
expresses this exactly : that this limit may be displaced, in principle at least, as
much as we wish inside the physical body of the individual who observes. There
is thus no part of the system which is essentially the observer, but in order to
formulate quantum theory, an observer must always be placed somewhere.
Terms like “observer” and “measurement” imply an essential passivity, Fuchs and Schack
have argued [35]; such words suggest a casual, uninvolved reading-off, rather than a partici-
patory act. But if we replace “observer” with “agent” in von Neumann’s concluding line, we
would have the statement, “In order to formulate quantum theory, an agent must always be
placed somewhere”; this claim, that agent is a fundamental concept which quantum theory
is built upon, would fit within QBism.
To a QBist, this is the killing flaw in von Neumann’s interpretation of quantum mechanics.
On the one hand, von Neumann affirms that one cannot formulate the theory without an
observer, but on the other, quantum states are physical properties of systems outside the
observer, and probabilities are frequencies in kollectivs or Keynesian logical valuations—
conceptions of probability which try to delete the agent at all cost.3
In broad overview, von Neumann’s approach to quantum measurement begins with a
physical system, which then interacts with some kind of measuring apparatus, which is
then studied by an observer. The system-apparatus and apparatus-observer interactions are
treated as physically distinct kinds of time evolution. Von Neumann calls the difference
between these processes “very fundamental” (§VI.1, p. 418).
If one takes quantum states to be intellectual tools held by an individual agent, then the
procedure of inserting an intermediate apparatus adds nothing to the basic philosophical
understanding of what quantum theory is about. It could well be a beneficial mathematical
exercise, part of working out what to do when making use of multipartite systems. (There
are good practical reasons to understand how the quantum formalism applies to a system one
of whose parts is a probe or an ancilla for the other, or is a communication channel whose
function is limited in some way.) Regardless, if quantum states are personalist Bayesian
quantities, then introducing probes and ancillas brings nothing intrinsically new. And if von
Neumann had seen quantum states in anything like the QBist fashion, it is difficult to find
a rationale for why MFQM ’s entire chapter on “the measuring process” assumes the shape
3 Arguably, von Neumann is not always consistent in his treatment of “psycho-physical parallelism.” A
careful reading of MFQM §VI.3 suggests that it elides the “limit between the observed and the observer”
which he deems essential, both in MFQM (§VI.1, p. 420) and at the Warsaw conference. But teasing out
the meaning of “psycho-physical parallelism” is no simple task [44], and for the purposes of this essay,
pursuing it in greater depth is not essential.
10
it does.
Fuchs has written, “von Neumann’s setting the issue of measurement in these terms was
the great original sin of the quantum foundational debate” [36, p. 2035].
VI. MEASUREMENT REDUX: THE “QUANTUM BAYES RULE”
Wikipedia attributes the statement “The first quantum Bayesian was von Neumann” to
R. F. Streater [95]. As mentioned earlier, the effect of saying this in an article which primarily
concerns QBism is to claim that von Neumann was himself either QBist or something much
like it. Looking up this source, we find that what Streater calls “Quantum Bayesianism”
could indeed reasonably include QBism. For example, he states that Bayesians “attribute all
the entropy in a state to the lack of information in the observer” (p. 71). And in discussing
density matrices, he writes, “the Bayesian’s ρ is entirely about his knowledge” (p. 72). So,
the meaning of the statement created by placing it within the Wikipedia article is not too
much of a stretch.
Streater bases his claim that von Neumann was the “first quantum Bayesian” on MFQM,
never addressing the plainly frequentist orientation of that book. Nor does Streater refer to
the passages about “subjective perception” and “experience.”
The root of the confusion appears to be that, towards the end of MFQM, von Neumann
derives a formula which turns out in retrospect to be a specialized case of a quantum analogue
of the Bayes conditioning rule. Von Neumann motivates his argument with the following
(p. 337):
If anterior measurements do not suffice to determine the present state
uniquely, then we may still be able to infer from those measurements, under cer-
tain circumstances, with what probabilities particular states are present. (This
holds in causal theories, for example, in classical mechanics, as well as in quan-
tum mechanics.) The proper problem is then this: Given certain results of
measurements, find a mixture whose statistics are the same as those which we
shall expect for a system S of which we know only that these measurements were
carried out on it and that they had the results mentioned.
Here, von Neumann treats quantum states as analogous to the physical states of classical
mechanics, i.e., to points in phase space. In classical mechanics, if a system could be at one
of multiple points in its phase space, we write a Liouville probability density over that space;
we can infer that for von Neumann, it is mixtures which are analogous to Liouville densities.
This is in sharp contrast with QBist and much other Quantum-Bayesian thinking, in which
all quantum states, however pure, are expressions of an agent’s probability assignments.
As always in MFQM, a system has a state, even if we don’t know what that state is.
And, as always in MFQM, statistics means ensembles of identically prepared systems:
If, for many systems S′1, . . . ,S′M (replicas of S), these measurements give the
results mentioned, then this ensemble [S′1, . . . ,S′M ] coincides in all its statistical
properties with the mixture that corresponds to the results of the measurements.
Changes in statistical properties mean the creation of new ensembles with different popula-
tion demographics:
11
That the results of the measurements are the same for all S′1, . . . ,S′M can be
attributed, by M., to the fact that originally a large ensemble [S1, . . . ,SN ] was
given in which the measurements were carried out, and then those elements for
which the desired results occurred were collected into a new ensemble. This is
then [S′1, . . . ,S′M ].
Here,M. refers to the measurement postulate, “If the physical quantity R is measured twice
in succession in a system S, then we get the same value each time” (p. 335).
So, we have something like the updating of probabilities by the Bayes rule. However,
von Neumann phrases the scenario in completely Kollectivist language. Merely invoking
Bayes’ theorem does not make one a Bayesian. For example, von Mises makes use of Bayes’
theorem, calling it “a proposition applying to an infinite number of experiments,” or in
other words, to a kollectiv [103, p. 123]. One could be wholly agnostic about the inter-
pretation of probability, setting up the theory from measure-theoretic or abstract-algebraic
axioms [96]; multiplication and division of probabilities would then be legitimate operations
having meaning only with respect to those axioms.
It is in this context that von Neumann mentions “a priori” and “a posteriori” proba-
bilities. These terms could be glossed in a Bayesian way, but only at the cost of ignoring
everything else MFQM says about the interpretation of probability, including the discussion
of “ensembles” in the same paragraph. And even if one were to do so, the way in which von
Neumann allows pre-existing physical properties to determine quantum states would imply
a view in which mixed states are Bayesian probability distributions over pure states. (And
though it could potentially be called “quantum Bayesian,” it is definitely not QBist.) This
is a difficult position to maintain, per the Jaynesian argument given above. Furthermore,
given the professed Kollectivism of MFQM, we should recall what von Mises said about
these terms [103, p. 46]:
It is useful to introduce distinct names for the two probabilities of the same
attribute, the given probability in the initial collective and the calculated one
in the new collective formed by partition. The current expressions for these
two probabilities are not very satisfactory, although I cannot deny that they are
impressive enough. The usual way is to call the probability in the initial collective
the a priori, and that in the derived collective the a posteriori probability.
This usage exactly parallels von Neumann’s. To continue:
The fact that these expressions suggest a connexion with a well-known philo-
sophical terminology is their first deficiency in my eyes. Another one is that
these same expressions, a priori and a posteriori, are used in the classical theory
of probability in a different sense as well, namely, to distinguish between prob-
abilities derived from empirical data and those assumed on the basis of some
hypothesis; such a distinction is not pertinent in our theory. I prefer, there-
fore, to give to the two probabilities less pretentious names, which have less
far-reaching and general associations. I will speak of initial probability and final
probability, meaning by the first term the probability in the original collective,
and by the second one, the probability (of the same attribute) in the collective
derived by partition.
Von Neumann uses the more common terminology, but the meaning which MFQM vests in
the words is, by all evidence, the same as that which von Mises does. The result is not an
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argument that probabilities should be seen as quantified fervencies of belief, but rather that
a certain problem involving ensemble frequencies admits nonunique solutions.
Von Neumann derives his basic relation betwen initial and final ensembles by considering
the following procedure (p. 340). We measure some binary physical property E on each
element of the initial ensemble, which is described by the statistical operator U0. The
elements for which this measurement yields the outcome 1 (instead of 0) are collected to
form a new ensemble, whose statistical operator is U . The two ensembles are related by
U =
∑
n
(U0φn, φn)P[φn]. (1)
Here, P[φn] is the projector onto the state φn, and the set {φ1, φ2, . . . , φn} is an orthonormal
basis which spans the subspace in which measuring E yields the value 1.
Lüders criticized von Neumann’s result and proposed a correction [58]. A more modern
way to represent state-change upon measurement is to write the Lüders rule using the
mathematics of effects and operations. A measurement is a positive operator valued measure
(POVM) which furnishes a resolution of the identity:∑
k
Ek = 1, (2)
and each of the {Ek} can be written
Ek =
∑
l
A†klAkl. (3)
Here, the index k labels the possible outcomes of the measurement. If the initial density
operator is U0, then upon obtaining the outcome k, we update the density operator to
U =
∑
lAklU0A
†
kl
tr(EkU0)
. (4)
For analyses of how this update rule is analogous to, or a variant of, Bayesian conditioning,
see Schack, Brun and Caves [84]; and also Fuchs [29]. Illustrative examples are developed
in Fuchs and Schack [30].
Streater bases his criticism of von Neumann on that found in the textbook of Krylov [53],
writing, “Krylov did not believe that all the characteristics of the state reflect only the lack
of knowledge of the observer, but that there was a physical state, ρ0 out there to be found.”
But this is exactly what von Neumann stated: recall that for him, a “mixture of several
states” is “not a state” itself (MFQM, p. 350).
Krylov’s primary complaint with von Neumann (pp. 184–85) is the multiplicity of valid
decompositions of mixed-state density operators.
Firstly, in using the statistical operator, we assume the selection of a certain
orthogonal system of coordinates in the subspace delimited by an inexhaustively
complete experiment and we also assume a certain choice of weights wi. [. . .]
A change in the orthogonal system means, generally speaking, a transition to
another physical state described by the statistical operator, to what is said to be
another statistical aggregate. (“A state” is understood here in a more general
sense than a state exhaustively completely determined, using a Ψ-function.) [. . .]
13
Therefore, the selection of a certain orthogonal system of functions and the fixing
of certain weights wi, which the von Neumann operator presupposes, amounts
to the introduction of some physically fictitious properties of the reality being
described.
That is, Krylov finds the conjunction of the following two statements unacceptable:
• A pure quantum state is a physical property of a system.
• The quantum formalism implies that a mixed-state statistical operator has multiple
decompositions into linear combinations of pure states.
Krylov insists upon the former and therefore finds the latter unsatisfactory. As we discussed
earlier, QBists (and some other varieties of quantum Bayesians) agree that these two state-
ments clash with each other, but discard the first instead. Von Neumann holds onto both
(MFQM, §IV.3).
VII. DISCUSSION
We have seen that “Quantum Bayesian” is not at all a good description of von Neumann.
Along the way, we have encountered some of the practical issues that make classifying
scientists a difficult problem. It is worth considering these issues more generally. Having
done so, we will conclude with some contemplations about the platform that made the claim
“the first Quantum Bayesian was von Neumann” visible enough to be noticed in the first
place.
A good classification summarizes, as succinctly as possible, the known statements and
actions of an individual, and should have predictive power for statements yet unmade or
undiscovered. Furthermore, the descriptive terms in commonest circulation should provide
the most useful and meaningful understanding of relevant distinctions that painting with a
broad brush can convey [9]. It is, to say the least, debatable that the jargon we have today on
the philosophical side of quantum theory fares at all well in this regard. Peres quips, “There
seems to be at least as many Copenhagen interpretations as people who use that term,
perhaps even more” [72]. For Żukowski, Copenhagen is “different for every apostle” [112].
Indeed, a good case can be made that the idea of a unified “Copenhagen interpretation” was
a myth of the 1950s, which now elides in our perception the differences among views held
by physicists thirty years earlier [14, 15, 45]. Similarly, Kent tabulates at least twenty-one
varieties of Everettian interpretation [49]. These can differ in underacknowledged ways from
Everett’s original [50], and many are “generally incompatible” with one another [51].
The terms we employ are signifiers that we use to determine what we bother to read.
They establish the distinctions which we allow to exist between the players in the histories
we retell. Then we pose those players according to our sentiments for the person and for
the philosophy.4
4 I myself have heard Feynman claimed as a Copenhagener, a Gell-Mannian, an Everettic and an enthusiast
for nonlocal hidden variables. The implication is that the correct interpretation of the quantum will
be decided, not even by opinion poll [37, 67], but by who occupies the most shelf space in the Caltech
bookstore.
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The story of von Neumann exemplifies other challenges as well. We scientists change
our views over time. We leave fragmentary records of our thoughts, not atypically muddled
by the compromises of coauthorship and journal publication. (The rise of an electronic
preprint culture has, among other things, provided a way to track what squeezing our works
into journals can do to them; for an example, see [26].) And because our attitudes can
be moving targets, combining a physicist’s statement from year N with another statement
they made in year N + 20 to deduce what they “must logically have believed” is an exercise
fraught with a scholarly kind of peril.
The scholarly literature is quite capable of spreading urban legends of its own [83]. What
happens when we bring Wikipedia into the mix?
The Wikipedia project bills itself as “the free encyclopedia that anyone can edit”; even
if we gloss “anyone” as “anyone with an Internet connection,” this is only true to a first
approximation. Individual users, or the machines they edit from, can be blocked from editing
for various lengths of time for offenses like persistent hate speech [25]. Also, individual
pages can be protected from editing to different extents. Wikipedia has its own policies and
community institutions [71], often referred to by acronyms (NPOV, NOR, FAC, FARC and
so forth). These, in addition to sheer size and visibility, distinguish Wikipedia from other
applications of the wiki concept, such as the nLab [69]. For example, Wikipedia has a “No
Original Research” policy [111], but the nLab has as one of its primary goals the facilitation
of original mathematical work.
On Wikipedia, the “right to figure forever in the history of the subject like a fly in
amber” [47] can be supported even by a mention in nothing more substantial than the
popular press, like by New Scientist magazine, despite the well-known failure modes of that
industry [36, p. 2221].
Thanks to the No Original Research policy mentioned earlier, correcting misconceptions
propagated by popular-science magazines and the like cannot begin with Wikipedia itself.
The NOR policy makes sense for what Wikipedia is and what it tries to be: an encyclopedia
is a tertiary source, rather than a primary or secondary one. Moreover, Wikipedia lacks
the infrastructure to evaluate original scholarship, and identifying who wrote what in its
articles is an arduous task, making it a poor place to advance new claims in a forthright
way. Academic life depends on receiving credit for one’s own work, and the way Wikipedia
articles are made flattens all contributions together, obscuring authorship. This essay is an
attempt to do in a different venue what cannot feasibly be done within Wikipedia alone: set
the record straight.
I thank John DeBrota and Chris Fuchs for discussions during writing and editing.
Appendix A: Things QBism Is Not
Taking the recent writings of Fuchs, Mermin and Schack as establishing what QBism is,
we can identify some things which QBism is not.
• A hidden-variable model. Quantum states in QBism are probability distributions
over potential experiences, not over values of putative hidden variables or agent-
independent “ontic states.” QBism is more compatible with the research pro-
gramme which uses hidden-variable models to reconstruct portions of quantum the-
ory [6, 19, 20, 27, 89, 90, 100]. In these constructions, one posits a classical theory
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with discrete or continuous degrees of freedom, and then one imposes a restriction on
what can be known about those degrees of freedom at any one time. The resulting sta-
tistical theory can qualitatively reproduce features of quantum mechanics (no-cloning
and no-broadcasting theorems, teleportation and so forth); in some cases, it exactly
reproduces a subtheory of quantum mechanics, including a subset of the states and op-
erations available in the full theory. The phenomena not reproduced, such as the hope
of computational speedup, are taken as indications of what is strongly nonclassical
about quantum physics. The goal is to follow these hints to an interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics as a statistical theory about something other than pedestrian hidden
variables. A QBist is not philosophically obligated to find this research programme
appealing, but it is much more aligned with QBism than attempts to reproduce all of
quantum theory using hidden variables could be.
• Solipsism. According to QBism, quantum theory concerns the interface between an
agent who uses quantum theory and the external world. Without the external world,
there would be no interface, no subject matter for quantum theory and, indeed, no
science [35, 63]. Notwithstanding this, over the years QBism has been accused of
solipsism; for examples and responses, see the list on pages xlv–xlvi of [36].5
• “The Copenhagen Interpretation.” It is difficult to define what, historically speaking, a
“Copenhagen Interpretation” should be. For the moment, it suffices to take a specific
reference which might be designated as Copenhagenish, the quantum physics volume
of Landau and Lifshitz [54]. The position of Landau and Lifshitz differs from QBism
in ways which Fuchs, Mermin and Schack have tabulated [33, 62, 63]. In particular,
the notions of “classical object” and “classical ‘apparatus’ ” are central to Landau
and Lifshitz’s interpretation, but not to QBism. We should also note that Bohr and
Heisenberg disagreed on the nature of the quantum/classical “cut” [15], and QBism
disagrees with both of them.
The ideas just itemized are incompatible with QBism: one who holds them is ipso facto
not a QBist. We can also identify some things which QBism does not mandate. For example,
a QBist does not have to expect that human beings, when tested in psychology laboratories,
must follow a Bayesian decision-making scheme. Fuchs, Mermin and Schack all use a Dutch
book argument which deduces the rules of probability from a normative requirement, and
humans are very good at falling short of normative requirements.6
On a more technical note, Fuchs and Schack demonstrate that we can view the Born rule
as an empirical addition to the bare structure of probability theory [35]. The Born rule does
not derive probabilities from some more fundamental kind of mathematical object; instead,
it relates one probability distribution to another, tying together the probability assignments
which an agent can consistly ascribe to different experiments.
What if one began with a different bare structure, other than probability theory as modern
personalist Bayesians know it? Following the speculations of Greenberger and Gill [36, pp.
5 A QBist could justifiably ask, “If there is no world outside of my head, where do all the papers on Bohmian
mechanics keep coming from?”
6 In addition, QBism does not require that the process of science as a whole be understood as clockwork
updating in accord with Bayes’ theorem [36, pp. 193, 500, 799, 1020, 1228, 1731]. The QBist investigations
of when probabilistic coherence arguments are or are not in force [34, 35] militate against such a view.
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567, 1265], we might imagine intelligent life evolving on Jupiter; when the Jovians turn
to mathematics, what constructions do they find intuitive and compelling? Perhaps they
are filamentous beings, and knot theory is to them as counting is to us. When a Jovian
quantifies its beliefs and expectations, it encodes them as a collection of knots. Instead of
a Dutch-book argument imposing conditions on sets of real numbers, Jovian coherence is
a normative standard about the combinations of knots that a good Jovian should strive to
maintain. Updating expectations in the light of new experiences is a matter of undoing and
retying conceptual tangles. The Jovian art of thread manipulation is a theory of learning,
helpful in at least some corners of life, just like Bayesian probability. And it is physics-
neutral, just as the bare structure of Terran probability theory is. Should the Jovians
develop quantum mechanics, the Born rule would be an empirical addition to their theory
of knots, an extra consistency or coherence condition phrased in the terms of that theory.
Thus, the use of personalist Bayesian probability theory itself may be secondary to a
deeper physical principle; however, this line of thought has not been developed in any
detail. And even if it were, some conceptions of probability, such as Lewisian objective
chance, assert the existence of physical properties which are incompatible with QBism [35].
An alternative theory of learning would not erase that incompatibility.
Appendix B: Von Neumann, Bohm and Lüders
In the main text, we have shown how von Neumann’s thinking, even when it turned to
notions like “subjective inner life,” did not align with Quantum Bayesianism or QBism. It is
also helpful to see how other physicists read von Neumann. Two historically significant ex-
amples, Bohm and Lüders, indicate how physicists who paid close attention to von Neumann
did not take a Bayesian message from his work.
One place where von Neumann’s influence was felt is David Bohm’s 1951 textbook, Quan-
tum Theory [8]. Bohm wrote this book before developing what we now call “Bohmian me-
chanics”; instead of trying to make sense of quantum theory using pilot waves, it aims to
present the perceived practical orthodoxy of the time. Bohm’s chapter on the “quantum
theory of the measurement process” references MFQM ’s discussion of that topic, with no
indication that Bohm found it flawed (p. 583, §22.1).
First, Bohm interprets quantum probabilities as long-run frequencies. The meaning of
a probability found by squaring the magnitude of a wave function depends, he says, on “a
large number of equivalent systems” prepared identically (p. 224, §10.30). Furthermore, for
an individual quantum system, there is in principle a correct quantum state; “the physical
state of the system” determines “the probability of a quantum jump” (p. 30, §2.5). Bohm
describes one thought experiment in the following terms (p. 606, §22.11):
The entire system, consisting of spin, z co-ordinate of the atom, apparatus which
measures the z co-ordinate, and apparatus which records the results of this
measurement, is assumed to have some pure wave function when the experiment
starts. (It is not necessary that any human observer know exactly what this
wave function is.)
If one of a set of quantum states might be physically present, Bohm treats the situation with
a “statistical ensemble of states” (p. 604, §22.10). Refining an ensemble to contain only a
single state “represents absolutely no change in the state of the spin”; indeed, Bohm goes
so far as to argue that this means the terms “mixed state” and “pure state” are misleading.
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It seems unwise to adopt a terminology that suggests the spin changes its state
(from mixed to pure) under circumstances in which nothing changes except
the observer’s information about the spin. The phrase “statistical ensemble
of states” provides a more accurate description.
For Bohm and von Neumann alike, states are physically present outside the physicist, and
uncertainty about which state might be extant is represented by statistical ensembles. Like
Bohm, von Neumann draws a categorical line between what we would call pure states and
mixed states.
Lüders, who criticized MFQM ’s treatment of state change due to measurement, kept to
MFQM ’s philosophy of probability [58].
In a measurement of R followed by a selection of rk, Z is transformed to
Z ′k = PkZPk.
Z ′k is not normalized [. . .] but instead is chosen so that the trace shows the
relative frequency of the occurrence of rk in the ensemble.
[Bei Messung von R mit nachfolgender Aussonderung von rk geht Z über in
Z ′k = PkZPk.
Z ′k ist nicht normiert [. . .] sondern so gewählt, daß die Spur die relative Häufigkeit
des Auftretens von rk in der Gesamtheit wiedergibt.]
Here we have someone who read von Neumann carefully and offered a correction to von
Neumann’s work. Lüders is plainly frequentist, yet never argues that this represents a
departure from von Neumann—because, as we have seen, it doesn’t.
Appendix C: Multiplicity of Density-Matrix Decompositions
The main text shows how the multiplicity of pure-state decompositions of a mixed den-
sity matrix is an important point to consider. The mathematical derivation is a standard
result [46, 85]; however, I was unable to find a source for it online that I did not have to pay
to download. For convenience, and to make clear what exactly is being claimed, I reproduce
the argument here.
Let ρ be a density matrix, and let {|eˆi〉} be a normalized eigenbasis of ρ with eigenvalues
{λi}. Denote the rank of ρ by k, and pick an arbitrary matrix M of dimensions r×k, where
r ≥ k, and the columns of M are orthonormal vectors in Cr. Then, for any such choice of
matrix M , the set of unnormalized states
|ψi〉 =
k∑
j=1
Mij
√
λj|eˆj〉, with i = 1, . . . , r, (C1)
provide a resolution of the density matrix ρ. The proof is straightforward. First,
r∑
i=1
|ψi〉〈ψi| =
r∑
i=1
k∑
l,m
M∗ilMim
√
λlλm|eˆm〉|eˆl〉. (C2)
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Using the orthonormality of the columns of M , we simplify this to
r∑
i=1
|ψi〉〈ψi| =
k∑
m=1
λm|eˆm〉〈eˆm|. (C3)
The quantity on the right is just the density matrix ρ, meaning that
ρ =
r∑
i=1
|ψi〉〈ψi|. (C4)
If we normalize the states {|ψi〉} by ∣∣∣ψˆi〉 = |ψi〉√〈ψi|ψi〉 , (C5)
then the density matrix is
ρ =
r∑
i=1
wi
∣∣∣ψˆi〉〈ψˆi∣∣∣, where wi = 〈ψi|ψi〉. (C6)
The coefficients wi give the statistical weightings of the states in the decomposition.
Appendix D: QBism in the Media
This essay was originally prompted by a claim in the Wikipedia article on “Quantum
Bayesianism,” a page that, then as now, focused on QBism. Since Wikipedia relies upon
secondary sources for material, it is worth noting the other places where QBism has been
treated in popular or semi-popular venues.
QBism has been written up both in New Scientist [18] and in Scientific American [101],
though not terribly accurately in either case, thanks to the editorial process [61–63]. A better
treatment, albeit in German, appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung [108].
Nature addressed it briefly in the context of information-oriented reconstructions of quantum
theory [4]. Later, Mermin published in Nature an opinion piece promoting QBism [60], which
was featured on the magazine cover.
In June 2015, the pop-science website Quanta Magazine ran an interview with Fuchs [38].
The accompanying profile is largely accurate, except for a figure caption that implies QBism
is a hidden-variable theory:
A quantum particle can be in a range of possible states. When an observer
makes a measurement, she instantaneously “collapses” the wave function into
one possible state. QBism argues that this collapse isn’t mysterious. It just
reflects the updated knowledge of the observer. She didn’t know where the
particle was before the measurement. Now she does.
A better caption would go more like the following:
In the textbook way of doing quantum physics, a quantum particle has a “wave
function” that changes smoothly when no one is looking, but which makes a
sharp jump or “collapse” when the particle is observed. QBism argues that
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this collapse isn’t mysterious. It just reflects the altered expectations of the
observer. Before the measurement, she didn’t know what would happen to her
when she interacted with the particle. After the measurement, she can update
her expectations for her future experiences accordingly.
(Originally, the subhead was also misleading; soon after the interview appeared, Quanta
fixed the subhead, but not the figure caption. So it goes.)
Later, Fuchs was interviewed for the Australian Broadcasting Company’s program, The
Philosopher’s Zone [40]. A pop-science book on QBism is also forthcoming [102].
Appendix E: How Wikipedia Fails, And Perhaps Why
Wikipedia’s treatment of QBism has other problems, beyond the historical matter that
the main text explores at length. For example, it asserts that QBism “is very similar to
the Copenhagen interpretation that is commonly taught in textbooks.” We can legitimately
ask what this might even mean. As we noted above, “the Copenhagen interpretation” is an
ill-defined term. Furthermore, claiming that “the Copenhagen interpretation” is “commonly
taught in textbooks” conflates both the early developers of quantum theory and the varied
modern expositions of it into a vague, undifferentiated mishmash. Asher Peres’ textbook is
more instrumentalist than the undergraduate standards [73]; the Feynman Lectures handle
probability in a less frequentist way than Peres [28]. Are all common textbooks Copenhagen,
or is Copenhagen that which is commonly taught in all textbooks?
The general disorganized sloppiness of the “Quantum Bayesianism” page illustrates what
happens when articles grow by accretion: many small additions, contributed by multiple
authors without an overall plan, forming a text by bricolage. Volunteer collaboration can
do great things, but just as not all computational problems admit an easy parallelization,
not all writing tasks are well served by the Wikipedia approach.
“Wander off the big ideas in the sciences,” writes one observer, “and you’re likely to
run into entries that are excessively technical and provide almost no context, making them
effectively incomprehensible” [97]. Of course, technical content has its place, but the material
that would lead into the technicalities, outlining the motivations and prerequisites for them,
isn’t there. It doesn’t get written, because that kind of work is harder to do by piecemeal
additions. Wikipedia relies on “drive-by contributors” [88] working in their copious free time
with only the haziest of overall plans, and with essentially no opportunity to get academic
recognition for their effort. This puts a great barrier in the way of building pedagogically
useful material.
The question of which topics get covered, and to what extent and with what level of
sophistication, is a fascinating one [41]. (At least, I have puzzled over it for years.) But
what happens when the material that does get written contains errors?
Obvious disruption on Wikipedia, like replacing entire articles with strings of profanity,
gets caught and reversed quickly. Subtle changes last longer and propagate farther. Some
silliness about the Golden Ratio and Duchamp’s Nu descendant un escalier n◦ 2 survived for
over a year, and when it was caught, the “fix” resulted in attributing a claim to a source that
did not contain it [93]. A couple of stoned college kids made a joking edit to the page of a
children’s book author, which endured for over five years and ended up uncritically accepted
in, among many other places, a book about Jesus [24]. A purported Australian aboriginal
deity, “Jar’Edo Wens,” lasted almost ten years and appeared in a book promoting atheism,
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among a long list of gods who had faded from belief [23].
Sometimes, the process even closes back upon itself: careless writers elsewhere use a
bit of entertaining trivia invented on Wikipedia, and their writings in turn become sources
to fill in the “citation needed” tag on the Wikipedia page. This is how the coati became
the “Brazilian aardvark” [80]. Similarly, thanks to other sites mirroring Wikipedia content,
the Wikipedia page for “Pareto efficiency” was self-referential for three months [43]. The
cartoonist Randall Munroe termed this process “citogenesis” [66], and the results can be
remarkably difficult to sort out, particularly if the debunking requires “Original Research.”
In the Wikipedian argot, “OR” includes “any analysis or synthesis of published material
that serves to reach or imply a conclusion not stated by the sources” [111]. If no source
explicitly states that “Jar’Edo Wens” is a hoax or that the “Brazilian aardvark” is a prank,
then arguing that they should be removed easily spills over into “OR.”
And so, Wikipedia’s own policies, well-intentioned as they are, can provide the amber to
preserve fabrications both whimsical and malicious. For good or ill, the flies endure.
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